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The expert is impurely altruistic in that she cares about both the client’s utility and her own reputational payoff that depends on the peer perception about her diagnostic ability.The decision of whether to perform the test, which is costly for the client, provides the expert with an opportunity to influence that perception.
Interestingly, the effect of reputational payoff on under-testing is non-monotonic, and the desire to appear of high type leads to under-testing only when the reputational payoff is intermediate.
Our results also suggest a more altruistic expert may be more likely to engage in under-testing.
Associate Professor of Marketing Johns Hopkins Carey Business School Joint faculty appointment: Department of Economics, Krieger School of Arts & Sciences Phone: 410-234-9247Email: [email protected] interests: Information disclosure and incentives Competitive marketing strategy Developing markets Shubhranshu Singh, Ph D (Business Administration, University of California at Berkeley; MBA, National University of Singapore, Singapore; MTech and MSc, Indian Institute of Technology Delhi, India) joined the Johns Hopkins Carey Business School in 2013.
He is an Associate Professor in the research track with expertise in the area of competitive marketing strategy and specific interest in developing markets.
An important policy implication is that an increase in the outside option of the poor micro-entrepreneurs might actually reduce their surplus.
Finally, we find that lenders in emerging markets may be more likely to engage in informal lending compared to those in developed or poorer markets.4.If the project fails, the borrower uses her outside option to repay over a period of time.The analysis uncovers an interesting effect of the borrower’s outside option on the loan rate offered by the lender - the loan rate first increases and then decreases with the borrower’s outside option.He uses micro-economic theory to study marketing problems. Howard/AMA doctoral dissertation award and the 2012 ISMS doctoral dissertation competition. Abstract: We study the problem a diagnostic expert (e.g., a physician) faces when offering a diagnosis to a client (e.g., a patient) that may be based only on her own diagnostic ability or supplemented by a diagnostic test—conventional and artificial intelligence (AI) tools alike—revealing the client’s true condition.The expert’s diagnostic ability (or type) is her private information.Only the agent observes whether a firm is a good fit.Corruption arises due to the agent’s incentive to select a non-deserving firm in exchange for bribes.We also uncover an interesting non-monotonic relationship between effectiveness of consumers’ effort and the firm’s incentives to seek certification.Finally, we find that certification can be welfare enhancing in the presence of consumer moral hazard.3.This paper investigates informal lenders’ and micro-entrepreneurs’ incentives to participate in a lender-borrower relationship in a market in which repayments are neither law-protected nor asset-secured.We consider a borrower who seeks a short-term loan, invests in a project, and repays in full using her project earnings if the project is successful.